Abstract -This paper considers what it might mean to describe the VAT as a "money machine," tests whether it is one, and asks if it might consequently be wise not to adopt it. We fi nd broadly persuasive evidence, using panel data for the OECD, for a "weak form" of the money-machine hypothesis: that countries with a VAT raise more revenue than those without. But the effect may not be large. The evidence also supports a "strong form" of the hypothesis: that this association refl ects not increased demand for government, but rather the greater effectiveness of the VAT in raising revenue. Models in which citizens/voters are likely to lose by entrusting politicians with a "money machine" rely on quite extreme views of their preferences and/or the effectiveness of electoral discipline.
INTRODUCTION
"Some panelists were . . . concerned that introducing a VAT would lead to higher total tax collections over time and facilitate the development of a larger federal government-in other words, that the VAT would be a 'money machine.' " 1 O ver the last 50 years or so, the value-added tax (VAT) has been introduced in around 130 countries, including all OECD members-with the sole and notable exception, of course, of the United States. A central claim made by proponents of the VAT is that it is a particularly effective tax, 2 reducing the welfare costs of raising any given amount of revenue and so facilitating increased revenue mobilization where (as clearly remains the case, in particular, in many developing countries that have adopted the VAT) this is an object of policy. But what proponents see as a merit of the VAT is turned on its head by some of the opponents of the tax, notably in the U.S., who see it, instead, as a fundamental fl aw. The VAT, on this view, is simply too easy a way of collecting revenue. Most recently and prominently, this concern weighed heavily on the minds of some members of the recent advisory panel on federal tax reform in the United States. And, indeed, it has run through much of the debate on the VAT in the U.S., dating back to the early work of Brennan and Buchanan (1977) , who specifi cally cite the VAT as an example of their general argument that the public well-being may ultimately be damaged by entrusting self-interested policy makers with effi cient tax instruments.
The purpose of this paper is to explore and evaluate the claim-and fear-that the VAT is a "money machine." What exactly might this irresistible but vague term mean? Is there any evidence that, somehow defi ned, the claim is, in fact, true? And if it is true, does that mean that adoption of the VAT is a good thing or a bad thing?
The next section sets the scene for this discussion with an overview of the key features and revenue signifi cance of the VAT in OECD countries, which are the natural focus of interest for the U.S. Following this, we try to tease out with some precision what it might mean to describe the VAT (or any other tax) as a "money machine," deriving testable implications that we explore using panel data for OECD members. The discussion then turns to the question of how political economy considerations might affect the desirability of entrusting policy makers with a money machine. A fi nal section concludes. Table 1 shows key features of the VAT in the non-U.S. OECD countries. As shown in the fi rst column, all OECD members other than the U.S. have adopted the VAT over the last 30 years or so, beginning with France 3 continuing through adoption by Australia in 2000. The (unweighted) average standard rate of VAT is about 17 percent, but with considerable variation. Within the EU, it varies between 15 percent (the minimum permissible under the union's rules) in Luxembourg, and 25 percent (the maximum) in Denmark and Hungary. And several non-EU countries apply far lower standard rates than this, the most striking being the fi ve-percent rate in Japan. 4 Most also apply a reduced rate to some commodities, with domestic zero-rating 5 being quite widespread. The fourth column shows that revenue from the VAT is also typically substantial-averaging a little over seven percent of GDP-but again with considerable variation, from a high of over 12 percent of GDP in Iceland to a low of around 2.5 percent in Japan. Importantly, this variation in revenue yield is only very imperfectly explained by differences in standard rates: the VAT in New Zealand, for example, raises nearly three points of GDP more than does that in the U.K. despite having a standard rate that is 5.5 points lower. While these differences in part refl ect structural differences in the wider economy, what also evidently matters a good deal in practice is not only the standard rate but also its coverage. Some sense of this is provided by the "C-efficiency" fi gure in the fi nal column of Table  1 , this being the ratio of VAT revenue to the product of aggregate consumption and the standard rate. For a textbook VAT levied uniformly on all consumption, C-effi ciency would be 100 percent. It is reduced below this by the application of zero or reduced rates, and by the exemp-3 Opinions differ as to precisely when France is best said to have adopted a VAT, having introduced various degrees of crediting from the late 1940s onwards.
BACKGROUND

4
This rate-applied also in Netherlands Antilles, Paraguay and Singapore-appears to be the lowest in the world.
5
"Zero-rating" means simply taxation at a zero rate, implying that no VAT is due on output but VAT paid on inputs is creditable in the usual way, implying such input VAT is refunded. This it quite distinct from "exemption," which is explained below. 
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Applies in Ceuta and Melilla axes on specifi c goods and services. tion 6 of fi nal consumption: this largely explains the relatively low C-effi ciency in the U.K., for example, which zero-rates about 13 percent of household expenditure and exempts another 30 percent. Variation in C-effi ciency across the OECD is evidently also wide, from nearly 100 percent in New Zealand, whose VAT is often taken as a model of good design, to as low as around 40 percent. Figure 1 shows the importance of the VAT as a source of revenue within the wider tax systems of the OECD, with countries ordered by the ratio of total taxation (defi ned throughout the paper to be inclusive of social security contributions) to GDP, and including the U.S. (and revenue from sales taxation) for comparison. The low level of sales tax revenue in the U.S., compared to the VAT elsewhere, stands out.
7 What is also clear, however, is that there are countries-Japan, Korea and Mexico-that have a VAT but "nevertheless" have smaller government than does the U.S. In that sense, adoption of a VAT is clearly not a suffi cient condition for large government. More generally, while there is, indeed, a positive association between revenue from the VAT and total tax revenue, the cross-country differences in government size are evidently not fully explained by differences in VAT revenue: Ireland and France, for example, both collect about four percent of GDP in VAT revenue, but the overall tax ratio is over ten points lower in the former than in the latter.
Such a tabulation can reveal little, however, about the links between VAT revenue and government size. It could be that cross-sectional differences in VAT revenue substantially "explain" cross-country differences in government size if account is also taken of other determinants of the latter (standard candidates including the levels of income per capita and openness). The difference in the size of government between Switzerland and Australia may refl ect structural differences in their wider economies, for example, with the VAT affecting not the difference in government size between them but rather its level in each. And along the temporal dimension too, it could be that the change in VAT revenue in each country over time explains a good deal of the change in its total tax revenue.
All this calls for a more structured empirical analysis, and we explore this below. For background, however, Table  2 provides some basic information on temporal developments, showing changes in total and VAT revenues, and in the rate structure, between 2003 and the year in which the VAT was introduced.
The fi rst three columns concern changes in the VAT itself. The first shows that the revenue importance of the VAT has, indeed, tended to creep up in the years following its introduction, on average by about 1.7 percent of GDP. But-as in almost all aspects of the VAT experience-there is considerable variation across countries. In several, this subsequent growth has exceeded four points of GDP; in a few others (including, somewhat surprisingly, France and Belgium), the revenue raised by the VAT, relative to GDP, has actually declined. This broad upward trend in revenue refl ects a clear tendency, shown in the second column, for the standard rate of VAT to increase over time, in some cases quite substantially; but again there are exceptions, not only in formerly socialist economies (which tended 6 "Exemption" means that no VAT is chargeable on sales (as under zero-rating), but (unlike zero-rating) VAT paid on inputs cannot be recovered; the Australian term "input-taxed" is more descriptive. Note the implication that while exemption of commodities purchased by fi nal consumers reduces revenue, exemption of items used as inputs by registered taxpayers tends to increase it (because it leads to "cascading" of the VAT-tax being charged on tax) and so also tends to raise C-effi ciency. This is one of the main pitfalls in using C-effi ciency as an indicator of the quality of the VAT, discussed, with others, in Ebrill et al. (2001) . to set high standard rates when the VAT was introduced, rapidly, at the start of the transition), but also, interestingly, in both Korea and Japan, which did not begin with especially high rates. It is notable too, that several of the countries that have increased their standard rate of VAT have also increased the number of reduced rates applied, presumably in an attempt (wise or not, given the possibility that better targeted instruments were available) to mitigate the perceived distributional impact of a higher standard rate.
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The fi nal column of Table 2 shows that governments in OECD countries have, indeed, tended to become larger after their adoption of the VAT, in the sense that the proportion of GDP taken in taxes and social security contributions was higher in 2003 than in the year prior to VAT introduction, by nearly six points. The fi nal column of the table shows that in most cases the increase in the overall tax ratio has been less than the revenue raised by the VAT itself. Thus, the revenue raised by the VAT has been to some degree offset by reduced revenue (at least relative to GDP) from other taxes. It will be seen in the next section that the nature and extent of such offsetting is of central importance in evaluating the money machine notion, and exploring this, controlling for other potential determinants of government size, will be a key part of the later empirical analysis.
WHAT IS A MONEY MACHINE?
What does or might it mean to say that the VAT is a money machine? The term seems to have proved too useful and evocative to defi ne precisely. One can, however, identify (at least) two distinct hypotheses of this kind. 9 The fi rst is simply that:
• Governments with a VAT raise more revenue, all else equal, than those without.
The second-recall the words "lead to" in our opening quotation from the President's Panel-asserts causality:
• The use of the VAT has in itself been a cause of increased government size.
Since the latter implies the former, but not vice versa, we shall for brevity refer to these as respectively the "weak" and "strong" forms of the money machine hypothesis. Nellor (1987) . This tests what is essentially the weak form of the money machine hypothesis by modeling the tax ratio (for 11 European countries) without introducing a VAT dummy but instead testing for an increase in the mean residual pre-and post-introduction (the results being broadly supportive of the weak form hypothesis).
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Formulating and testing the strong form of the money machine hypothesis, with the element of causality, is more challenging, and does not seem to have been 9 One version of the money machine story seems to assert that the VAT is a particularly easy way for governments to raise tax revenue because it can be "hidden" in the consumer price. This is simply wrong: there is no reason why it should not be required that VAT be separately identifi ed in the price charged to consumers, and, indeed, several countries, including Canada and Italy, do precisely that. The discussion here focuses on "money machine" notions resting on genuinely distinctive features of the tax. 10 Throughout, we conceive of government "size" in terms of total tax revenue. Non-tax revenue is relatively small for the OECD countries with which we are concerned; and revenue data is more readily available than are data on total government expenditure (the two in any event being linked, presumably, at least in present value). 11 Stockfi sch (1985) applies a "difference in differences" logic to address an analogous question cast in terms of the growth of government size rather than (the more natural concern) its level, asking whether the change in the growth of the tax ratio around the time of introduction of the VAT was greater in countries that adopted the tax than in those that did not (and concluding that any such effect was at best modest).
addressed in the previous literature. We shall pursue two approaches. The fi rst approach is essentially statistical: to ask whether revenue from the VAT Granger-causes total tax revenue (both relative to GDP), in the sense that lagged values of the former are useful in predicting future values of the latter (but not, if the case is to be clinched, vice versa).
The second approach conceives of causality not in a temporal sense, but as a comparative statics statement. More precisely, suppose that the weak form of the money machine hypothesis were empirically verifi ed, so that there is indeed a positive association, all else equal, between VAT revenue and government size. There would be broadly two possible explanations of this. The fi rst is that increased taste for government spending has created revenue needs which have been met by adopting a VAT. The second is that access to the VAT has in itself so increased the effi ciency of the tax system that governments have found it optimal to use it to increase their total tax revenues. The latter would seem to be the key claim underlying the strong money machine hypothesis. To see how one might test for it, a simple formalization of the tax design problem is helpful.
Consider then a government that has two tax instruments at its disposal, A and B, and that chooses the revenue R i raised by each so as to maximize an objective function
where V denotes the private utility derived from public expenditure, with λ parameterizing the strength of this preference, and the squared revenue terms capture the notion that the marginal effi ciency cost of raising revenue by any tax instrument increases with the amount raised, while the θ i parameterize the effi ciency of the two tax instruments (higher values indicating a less effi cient tax). The necessary conditions on the R i are then:
To see the implications, suppose fi rst that the taste for government increases, in the sense that λ becomes larger. Then it is readily seen 12 from [2] that the revenue optimally raised by each tax increases (and indeed, given the simple functional forms being used, they increase by the same proportion). Thus, an increased taste for government is optimally fi nanced by increasing revenue from all tax instruments.
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Now suppose instead-to capture the notion that access to a VAT means access to a more effective tax-that one of these instruments, say A, becomes more effi cient, in the sense that θ A falls. It is straightforward to show from [2] that, as one would expect, both the revenue raised by A and total revenue R A + R B optimally increase. Importantly, however, revenue optimally raised by B-the tax whose effi ciency is unchanged-optimally falls. The reason is straightforward: the social benefi t from access to a more effi cient tax instrument is optimally taken partly in the form of increased public expenditure, but partly too in the form of reduced reliance on less effi cient tax instruments. The degree to which increased revenue from A is offset by reduced revenue from B can be shown to be larger-and, hence, the increase in total revenue smaller-the greater in absolute value is V″ and the larger is θ B . For the more rapidly the marginal valuation of public spending falls, and the more costly is the alternative revenue source, the less is the social benefit from expanding total revenue relative to that from reducing reliance on less effi cient taxes. 14 While the weak form of the money machine hypothesis is, thus, consistent with two possible views of the worldone in which increased taste for government generates an increase in revenue from all sources, and the other in which growth of government is driven by the greater effi ciency of the VAT-the strong form of the hypothesis, which rests on the second of these views, carries the further and testable implication that the revenue that countries raise through the VAT should have been offset, to some degree, by reduced revenues from other taxes. In this case, the increase in total revenue associated with use of the VAT will be less than the revenue from the VAT itself.
EVIDENCE
Does the empirical evidence bear out either form of the money machine hypothesis? We consider each in turn.
A Weak Money Machine?
The natural way to test for a positive association between overall revenues and the presence of a VAT, as noted above, is simply to estimate a VAT-augmented "tax effort" equation of the general form
where the dependent variable R it is the ratio of tax revenue to GDP in country (2006), but on a much larger sample of countries-the concern there being with the impact of the VAT on the full span of countries-and using a different measure of R it . That paper also addresses the potential bias arising from the endogeneity of VAT adoption. That is, there may be some unmeasured characteristic of a country that affects both the likelihood of its adopting a VAT and the likely revenue gain from doing so. This bias can be corrected, and its existence tested for, by also estimating a VAT adoption equation and then including a Heckman-type correction in the revenue equation. Keen and Lockwood (2006) fi nd, however, no evidence of such bias, and so here we proceed by simply estimating [3] as it stands. Table 3 shows the results of regressions along these lines. The dataset is the full set of the 30 current OECD member countries for the period 1965-2004 (covering, for each, years subsequent to membership). Throughout, the dependent variable is tax revenue including social security contributions. While the panel is unbalanced, the coverage is quite good, with at least two-thirds of all country-year 14 While these formalities conceive of an increase in the effi ciency of a tax instrument as a small improvement in one already adopted, it is straightforward to establish a similar result for the discrete adoption of an initially unused tax that is more effi cient at the margin than that in place: total revenue can be shown to increase by an amount smaller than that optimally collected from the new tax alone. 15 As the example of France noted above suggests, the date of adoption is not always entirely clear-cut. To pick up general time variation in omitted variables, column 2 adds the year dummies η (the country effects π being included in all regressions). This reduces the effect of VAT on total revenue, but serial correlation remains, pointing to more complex dynamics. Column 3, therefore, adds a lagged dependent variable, denoted R -1. This eliminates the serial correlation (the p-value of the test statistic is now below 0.05), but now the effect of the simple VAT dummy becomes small and insignifi cant.
These estimates are subject, however, to the bias that arises from estimating equation [3] by OLS in the presence of a lagged dependent variable. 18 This bias is of order 1/T, where T is the number of time-series observations, and so may be fairly modest in a panel of the length used here. Nevertheless, as a check on this, column 4 estimates the same regression as in column 3, but using the Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator. In this case, robust z-statistics, which are normally distributed, are given in parentheses. The Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation is passed easily. 19 The coeffi cients in columns 3 and 4 are reasonably similar. Moreover, when T is large, as in our case, the Arellano-Bond estimator may exhibit fi nite-sample bias due to overfi tting. So, we proceed by using the OLS estimator, using country dummies to pick up the fi xed effects π i in [3]. Regression 5, therefore, introduces interaction terms between the VAT dummy and all the standard tax effort variables, as well as an interaction with a dummy for a federal country.
20 Now the VAT terms are jointly strongly signifi cant, although individually they are not. Interestingly, the sign pattern of effects from the VAT proves complex, and does not obviously point to an overall revenue gain-a point we return to shortly. 16 The largest possible number of observations is 40 × 30 = 1,200, there being 30 countries and 40 years. So, the coverage for any regression can be measured as N/1,200, where N is given in Table 3 . 17 For brevity, we do not discuss in any detail the point estimates on the conditioning variables. It may be noted, however, that the negative (and often insignifi cant) effect from income per capita that recurs in these regressions is consistent with the fi ndings of others (see for instance Rodrik (1998), and the potential explanation of this in Keen and Lockwood (2006) ). That the coeffi cient on openness is negative and generally insignifi cant is more surprising, with Rodrik (1998), notably, fi nding a positive association even amongst higher income countries: it appears that this relationship is not present within the OECD subset of this group. 18 This is the "within groups" estimator. 19 The p-value for this test is 0.29, indicating that the null of no second-order autocorrelation is easily accepted.
Because the Arellano-Bond estimator estimates a fi rst difference of [3], this indicates that there is no fi rst-order serial correlation in the u it . 20 The potential role of this variable in regressions of this kind is discussed in Keen and Lockwood (2006) . Note that because we also have country fi xed effects in all regressions, the baseline effect of a federal country on revenue is unidentifi ed, as this dummy has no variation over time for any country in the sample.
Columns 6 and 7 test the robustness of these results. Regression 6 adds additional controls: the (log of the) of population size (POP), demographic variables (the proportions of the population 65 or older (DEPOLD) and 14 or younger (DEPYOUNG), and a dummy variable recording whether the country was in an International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis program. Regression 7 addresses a possible concern that there are relatively few years of observations on the OECD dataset on some of the newer members, dropping any country from the sample for with there are less than 30 years of observations of the tax to GDP ratio.
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In column 6, the VAT terms fail the test for joint signifi cance at fi ve percent, although only somewhat marginally. In the fi nal regression, the VAT terms are again jointly strongly signifi cant. Moreover, some terms are also individually significant. First, there is a significant positive baseline effect from the simple VAT dummy-and it is large, implying an increase in the tax ratio of just under fi ve percent of GDP. This is mitigated, however, by a significantly negative interaction effect through the income variable, implying a smaller gain in higher income countries. This is a surprising fi nding, the conventional wisdom (which Keen and Lockwood (2006) verify on a wider set of countries) being that the gain from the VAT is likely to be larger at higher income levels, a common argument being that in this respect income serves as a good proxy for capacity to administer and comply with the VAT. One possible interpretation of the results here is that such effects are significant only up to some basic level of capacity that is readily met by all OECD members. As one would expect given the political and technical diffi culties of applying the VAT to farming, the apparent gain from the VAT tends to lower where the agricultural sector is larger. Though never individually significant, the robustly positive coeffi cient on the interaction of the FED dummy is also striking, and suggestive perhaps-this too is no more than speculation-that the technical necessity 22 of adopting a VAT at the central rather than lower level makes it a useful device for avoiding erosion of the tax base that may otherwise arise from allocating tax powers to lower-level governments. More puzzling is the interaction with openness. Conventional wisdom is that the VAT works best in more open economies, since there is then a large import base on which the tax can readily be levied. In these regressions, however, the coeffi cient on the interaction with openness not only proves to be individually insignifi cant but also varies in sign. There is, thus, no suggestion of such effects at work within the OECD countries.
As noted above, the pattern of sign effects means that the direction of the revenue effect associated with the VAT is in principle uncertain, depending on country-specifi c characteristics. A natural way to explore this is by evaluating the revenue gain from the presence of a VAT at the mean values of the controls, X -for those countries and years in which a VAT is not in place; that is, to calculate ΔR = α + β′ v X -, which is the predicted gain from the adoption of the VAT by a "typical" country in the sample without a VAT. This gain does, indeed, prove to be positive. For example, expressed as a percentage of that hypothetical country's tax ratio, for the specifi cation in column 7 it is 1.6 percent, which is modest but not insubstantial. For specifications 5 and 6, the gains are 2.1 and 0.5 percent, respectively.
Overall, then, there are signs that, within the OECD, the VAT has indeed proved to be a "money machine" in the weak sense. Though the evidence is not overpowering, and the impact of the VAT appears to be sensitive to country-specifi c characteristics, the presence of a VAT does seem to have a signifi cant contemporaneous effect on the tax ratio, and, for the "typical" OECD country, it is positive-but it is also quite modest.
A Strong Money Machine?
With there thus being some evidence in support of the weak form of the money machine hypothesis, attention turns next to the strong form: Is there any evidence that the rise of the VAT has been a cause of increased government size or is it better seen as a consequence? As discussed above, there are broadly two ways of approaching this question empirically.
Has the VAT Granger-caused the Growth of Government?
The fi rst approach is to test for causality in the statistical Granger-sense: variable X "Granger-causes" variable Y, recall, if lagged values of X are signifi cant when regressed on current and lagged values of Y. Subject to some well-known qualifi cations, 23 which are not likely to be relevant here, Granger-causality tests in a well-defi ned sense for causality between economic variables.
To implements this, we run a two-variable unrestricted vector autoregression in total tax revenue (R) and VAT revenue (RV), both relative to GDP, using the panel data set described above. Generally, the regressions run were: , where θ i and π i are country fi xed effects, and u it and ω it are random errors, assumed i.i.d. The optimal lag lengths were chosen using Akaike's Information Criterion (AIC). Specifi cally, for each of the regressions in Table 4 below, we considered four possibilities-with either one or two lags of each of R and RV-and report the specifi cation that minimizes the AIC. Regressions 1 and 2 have no additional controls other than country dummies, while 3 and 4 introduce in addition the standard controls for a tax effort equation, as discussed above. Note that when the AIC specifi es that two lags of the non-dependent variable should be included, (as in regressions 2-4), we test for the joint signifi cance of these lags using an F-test, as reported in the table. Without controls, there appears to be two-way Granger causality (at the standard fi ve percent signifi cance level) between R and RV: that is, lagged values of RV help determine R and vice-versa (for the latter case, the F-test shows the coeffi cients on lagged revenue to be jointly signifi cant, though not individually so). When country controls are introduced, however, causality runs only one way, from total revenue to VAT revenue. At ten percent, however, two-way causality cannot be rejected.
In a purely statistical sense, there is, thus, no strong evidence that the VAT has in itself caused the growth of government.
Has Increased VAT Revenue Been Offset by Reduced Revenue from Other Taxes?
The second approach is more structural, exploiting the result established above:
If the greater effi ciency of the VAT itself explains the growth of government, then any increase in total revenue should be less than that from the VAT itself, with that greater effi ciency refl ected in part in reduced reliance on other forms of tax.
Is there any sign that there has, indeed, been such offsetting in OECD countries? To explore this, we estimate a variety of specifi cations of the general form:
it , with RV, as before, denoting revenue from the value added tax (as a share of GDP) Z; a vector of additional variables δ, γ v , σ and γ, parameters to be estimated; and the last three terms again being country-and time-effects and an idiosyncratic error. The dataset used for this exercise is the same unbalanced panel of all current OECD members as used above. Note that we include all observations in this estimation, including those in which no VAT was present, and include the simple VAT dummy V to allow for an effect on other revenue from the presence of the VAT that is independent of the revenue it raises-a common claim, for example, is that implementation of a VAT also provides information useful for the enforcement of the personal income tax. This device also provides a simple way of allowing for some non-linearity in the relationship between total and VAT revenues.
Interest centers on the extent to which revenue raised by the VAT is offset (or, conversely, matched) by reductions (increases) in revenue from other taxes. Once a VAT has been adopted, this is given by γ v in the short run and by [7] φ γ δ ≡ − V 1 in the long run. Thus φ = 1 corresponds to zero offsetting of increased VAT revenues, at the (intensive) margin, with φ < 1 corresponding to some marginal offset and φ > 1 to increases in revenue from the VAT being accompanied by increased revenue from other taxes too. Assessing the full revenue effect of the VAT also requires taking account, however, of any discrete effect σ from its presence, a point to which we shall return. Results are reported in Table 5 . 24 The fi rst column reports OLS estimates of [6], with the lagged dependent variable suppressed. This suggests that a one-point increase in the revenue raised by an existing VAT, rela- tive to GDP, is generally offset by a reduction in revenue from other taxes of about 0.4 points, so that while revenue increases, it does so by only 0.6 points of GDP. The presence of a VAT in itself, however, has a signifi cantly negative impact on total revenue, suggestive of non-linearity in the relationship. But the F-test also indicates signifi cant fi rst-order serial correlation, pointing again to more complex dynamics. A further concern is the potential for endogeneity bias arising from common shocks to VAT and total revenue. The second column, therefore, introduces the lagged dependent variable, using the Arrelano-Bond (1991) GMM estimator so as to deal with the potential bias from the lagged dependent variable, and addressing the endogeneity issue by treating VAT revenue as predetermined. Now the degree to which increased revenue from an existing VAT is offset appears to be much greater in the short term, and much smaller in the long term. The point estimate of φ is significantly different from zero-so that marginal increases in VAT revenue are indeed associated with increases in total tax revenue-but is also less than one. This suggests that increases in VAT revenue have not simply occurred in tandem with increases in revenue from other taxes but rather, at the margin, have been used to reduce reliance on these alternatives. Note too that the discrete impact of the VAT dummy remains signifi cantly negative.
Column 3 reports the results of eliminating the variables in column 2 that proved insignifi cant at ten percent, the results being broadly unchanged. Finally, column 4 reports the same specifi cation estimated only on observations for which a VAT was in place: as one would expect given the negative discrete effect of the VAT, the marginal replacement that emerges now appears somewhat lower.
What does this imply for the strong money machine hypothesis, the key prediction of which, recall, is that revenue from the VAT will be in part offset by reduced revenue from other sources?
At the margin-that is, considering increased revenue from an existing VATthis does, indeed, appear to be the case, though the degree of offset is fairly small: the point estimate of φ is fairly robustly less than unity. The hypothesis that it equals unity cannot be rejected, but the estimates are far from being so much in excess of unity that a demand-led explanation of marginal increases in VAT revenue-that this has been just one way in which a stronger taste for government has been metappears clearly the less plausible of the two. The discrete negative revenue impact of the presence of a VAT, suggestive of an underlying non-linearity, complicates but does not overturn this interpretation. To see this, note fi rst that [3] implies the long-run impact on total revenue of introducing a VAT that raises revenue RV to be Using the point estimates in column 3, ΔR will, thus, be positive so long as revenue from the VAT exceeds about 4.6 percent of GDP-which, as can be seen from Table 5 , it indeed does in almost all OECD countries. The results are, thus, broadly consistent with the VAT at least having been a net addition to revenue. But-and consistent with our earlier results on the weak money machine, reported in Table 3 -this addition may in many cases be quite small, since the degree to which increased VAT revenue has been offset by reductions in other taxes has tended to be quite large. 25 Consider, for 25 While this runs counter to Kenny and Winer's (2006) empirical support for the scale effect-higher total revenue being found there to be associated with higher revenue, relative to GDP, from all main tax categories-their work focuses on a much wider range of countries and does not distinguish between the VAT and other taxes on goods and services. example, the "average" OECD country, which (from Table 1 ) collects about 7.2 percent of its GDP in VAT revenue. Using again in [6] the point estimates of column 3, the associated long-run increase in total revenue is about 2.4 percent of GDP: around two-thirds of the revenue raised by the VAT is, thus, offset by reduced revenue from other taxes.
POLITICS AND MONEY MACHINES
Suppose then that, as the results above suggest is, indeed, the case, the VAT is, indeed, a money machine, in the sense of being an especially effective form of taxation. How persuasive are the political economy arguments that it would, as a consequence, be a good idea to prevent a government from adopting one?
The clearest statement of the view that it may be wise to preclude the use of efficient tax instruments is that of Brennan and Buchanan (1977). The essence of their argument is that the citizenry may benefi t by imposing restrictions, at the constitutional phase, on the set of tax instruments available to a revenuemaximizing Leviathan who will be essentially unconstrained in the post-constitutional phase. 26 In this way, they can benefi cially limit the resources that the Leviathan will be able to extract from them.
This line of argument has proved extremely infl uential. It clearly refl ects, however, a quite restrictive view of both the objectives of policy makers and the constraints, notably electoral, under which they operate. The more recent political economy literature, largely spawned by this work, suggests a series of insights as to how these further considerations may affect the case for entrusting policy makers with effective tax instruments.
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Consider fi rst the implications of simply relaxing the view that policy makers attach no explicit value to the welfare of the citizenry. Suppose, for example, that policy makers seek to maximize some function W(C,U) defi ned not only over the tax revenue C that they can divert to their own private benefi t (which is the sole concern of the classic Leviathan), but also, at least to some degree-perhaps only in order to deter their own overthrow-about the welfare of the citizenry, U. To see the implications, note that in the framework above (now, for simplicity, assuming a single tax instrument), private utility would then be
Consider now how an increase in the effi ciency of the tax system-a reduction in θ-affects the policy maker's possibility frontier in (C,U)-space. Clearly, it shifts unambiguously outwards: 28 a more effi cient tax instrument enables policy makers to leave the citizenry better off for any given level of resources enjoyed by themselves. So long as U is normal in the policy makers' preferences, this income 26 The formal structure of their argument is simple and, by the standards of the later literature, ad hoc. Knowing that policy makers will divert some fi xed proportion of tax revenue to their own use, citizens restrict the tax instruments available to them in such a way that the maximum revenue which can be raised, net of this diversion, will be just such as to fi nance their desired level of public spending. 27 One vein of the literature not pursued in detail here focuses on the role of interest groups. Becker and Mulligan (2003) , in particular, explore a framework in which the size of government is determined by non-cooperative strategic interaction between taxpayers and the benefi ciaries of government spending, both of whom can expend resources to affect levels of revenue and spending. Like us, they consider the effect of a change in the effi ciency of tax instruments on the equilibrium size of government, fi nding that an exogenous increase in the effi ciency of the tax system does not necessarily make both groups better off. This has the same fl avor as the results here, and in that sense is consistent with our broad conclusions, but the mechanism at work is entirely different.
effect of the tax innovation thus leads to an increase in citizens' well-being. But there is also a substitution effect at work, and this tends to act in the opposite direction: raising the revenue to fi nance a marginal increase in C now has a smaller effi ciency cost, and so requires less of a reduction in U. Thus, as well as shifting outwards, the possibility frontier thus becomes flatter (here visualizing C as being on the horizontal axis), which in itself inclines policy makers to reduce U. The extent of this flattening, it can be shown, is greater the more rapidly citizens' marginal valuation of the spending from which they benefi t, V′, declines with the level of spending: intuitively, the increased provision of the public good made possible, for given C, by the increased efficiency of the tax system then leads to a greater reduction in that marginal valuation and, hence, increases the rent extraction that the policy maker must forego in order to achieve some given increase in private utility.
The impact on citizens' utility of access to a money machine is, thus, in this simple case, ambiguous. Broadly speaking, it is more likely to be positive the greater is the income elasticity of the policy makers' demand for citizens' utility, and the smaller is V″. It is hard to translate these concepts into hard numbers. What is clear, however, is that even with policy makers who look largely to their own narrow interests, allowing them access to effi cient tax instruments may well increase citizens' welfare. Indeed, this is sure to be the case, for example, if V″ = 0, since then (as the intuition above suggests and is readily verifi ed) the slope of the possibility frontier remains unchanged as θ falls, so that the substitution effect vanishes. In this sense, even an only slightly less pessimistic view of policy makers' preferences can imply a much more optimistic outlook for the consequences of entrusting them with a money machine.
Policy makers may also be faced with a series of constraints under which they operate. A natural response to a fear that government is inclined to tax and spend too much, for instance, is to impose direct limits on the level of spending, so providing some protection whilst also enabling whatever level of revenue is needed to be raised in the most effective way. Several countries, such as Sweden for example, do exactly this.
Elections, of course, are a key device for restraining abusive policy making.
What then if policy makers have to face elections?
Consider fi rst the Downs (1957) model of electoral competition, the key feature of which is that successful candidates for office are obliged to implement the policies that they announce before the election. More precisely, suppose that, in the notation above, two identical non-benevolent candidates i = A,B simultaneously propose policies (R i ,C i ), and then an election follows. Candidates are precommitted to implementing their proposed policy if elected, care about holding offi ce in itself-from which they derive some positive non-monetary "ego-rent" E-and have preferences over policy given by W(C,U) if they win the election (with a payoff of zero if not elected). Elected politicians' interests are, thus, not fully aligned with those of the electorate. Nevertheless, if voters care only about policies (that is, have no bias, for ideological or other reasons, in favor of one candidate or another), and have identical preferences, then it is easily seen that the only possible equilibrium outcome 29 is one that maximizes voter utility U. Therefore, in this equilibrium, there is no rent-diversion in equilibrium. In the absence of voter biases, electoral competition completely eliminates the discretion that policy makers have to exploit the population-and an increase in the effi ciency of available tax instruments undoubtedly benefi ts the voters.
This conclusion is modifi ed if some or all of the voters are in part motivated by factors other than the policies at immediate issue. To take a very simple example (based on Dixit and Londregan (1996)), suppose now that voters have an identical ideological preference parameter 30 in favor of (say) candidate A, which is drawn from a uniform distribution on [-B,B]. Thus B measures the ex ante degree of voter bias: the greater is B, the greater is the expected bias of all voters in favor of one candidate or the other. 31 The sequence of events we consider is again the Downsian one: politicians fi rst simultaneously propose policies, to which they are committed; the ideology parameter is then realized; and the vote then takes place. It is easily calculated 32 that in this case there is a symmetric equilibrium in which both candidates propose a policy (C*,R*) and each is elected with ex ante probability (prior to the realization of the ideology parameter) of one-half.
The key property of the political equilibrium that emerges in this case, for present purposes, is that (under a weak technical condition) rent-extraction C* is strictly positive-in sharp contrast to the simple case above-but less than it would be without elections. Intuitively, the presence of an ideological bias provides some cover behind which policy makers can extract surplus for themselves without doing excessive damage to their electoral prospects; at the same time, the prospective ego-rents provide an incentive not to jeopardize those prospects by paying too little attention to voters' well-being. Thus, rent diversion can be shown to be lower the greater are the ego-rents from offi ce, E, and the less biased are voters (the lower is B). The stronger is electoral competition (the higher is E/B), the more likely it is, other things equal, that an increase in the effi ciency of the tax system will translate in equilibrium into a welfare gain for voters. Loosely put, if politicians are self-important rather than venal, or if citizens vote largely on policies rather than personalities, then the case for denying them effi cient tax instruments is weakened.
An unattractive feature of the Downsian framework, however, is the assumption that electoral candidates can precommit to pursue particular policies if elected (with the further and unrealistic implication in the present context that the degree of rent extraction C must be observable), irrespective of their own preferences. This in turn precludes any role for such realistic behavior as voting based on the past performance of the incumbent. Both of these features can be relaxed. Besley and Smart (2003) , in particular, consider a simple framework of this kind in which there are two types of politicians-some pure Leviathans, concerned only with the surplus C they can extract from themselves, some wholly benevolent-competing for offi ce in a world with a two-period term limit. Voters do not directly observe politicians' types, and while they can observe the taxes they pay and the public services 30 This is, of course, unrealistic and means that in equilibrium all voters vote in the same way: almost always, some candidate will get 100 percent of the votes, because the common bias of the voters will generically differ from the difference in voter utility from the two policy proposals. This could be avoided, as in Dixit and Londregan (2002) , by also introducing individual-specifi c randomness to smooth the outcome, but this also complicates the model. 31 Denoting by β the bias variable distributed on [-B,B], the bias in favor of some candidate (either A or B) is simply the absolute value of β, which, given the uniform distribution of β, has expected value of B/2 . 32 For the proof of this, and of the claims that follow, see Appendix C. they enjoy, they cannot observe the cost of providing those services or, hence, the surplus that the incumbent policy maker extracts for themselves.
There are then broadly two types of outcome, depending on the parameters of the model. One possibility is that Leviathan incumbents "go for broke," extracting as much revenue as they can when in offi ce 33 and accepting that in doing so they will reveal their identity as Leviathans, and consequently not be re-elected (a separating equilibrium). The other possibility is that Leviathan incumbents will restrain the amount of revenue they raise so as to mimic the behavior of a benevolent policy maker faced with an adverse cost shock, and so improve their chances of being re-elected and extracting as much surplus as they can in a fi nal period of offi ce (a pooling equilibrium).
Within this framework, Besley and Smart (2003) directly address the question of interest here: might an increase in the effi ciency of the tax system actually reduce voter welfare (evaluated ex ante before the type of the fi rst-period incumbent is known)? A key result is that this cannot be the case if the nature of the equilibrium does not switch from pooling to separating or vice versa: in a separating equilibrium, for example, an increase in tax efficiency generates an evident gain for voters if the incumbent policy maker is benevolent-and if they are not, they continue to simply raise and spend on themselves as much revenue as they can. Interestingly, this conclusion of an unambiguous welfare gain from access to a more effi cient tax instrument rests on an assumption that V″ = 0 that was seen earlier to be suffi cient to ensure a welfare gain in the simple model of unconstrained but partly benevolent policy makers above.
An increase in the effi ciency of the tax system may, however, reduce voter welfare if it leads to a change in the nature of the equilibrium. Since such an increase makes it more attractive for Leviathan to mimic a benevolent policy makerthe later would now choose a higher level of public good provision, which enables the former to extract more rent by pretending that its cost has proved high-the relevant possibility is a shift from separating to pooling. The additional discipline this exerts on an incumbent Leviathan clearly benefits the voter. Against this, however, the electoral process now becomes less effective at removing Leviathans (since they no longer reveal themselves), and so creating more risk of abuse in the fi nal term of offi ce. This source of loss is greater the higher the likelihood that a candidate with no record of offi ce would prove to be benevolent. 34 For this reason-and counter perhaps to simple intuition-an increase in tax effi ciency that shifts the qualitative equilibrium is more likely to reduce voter welfare the fewer politicians are potential Leviathans.
CONCLUSIONS
The empirical analysis of the OECD experience reported here suggests that the answer to the question posed in our title is: "Yes, but…." The VAT does, indeed, appear to have been a "money machine" in both senses of the term defined here. It seems to have been a money machine in the weak sense that countries with a VAT tend to raise more revenue, all else equal, than do those without. And it seems also to have been a money machine in the stronger sense that, although the VAT does not appear to have statistically "caused" an increase in government size, the revenue that it raises has to some degree been offset by reduced revenues from other taxes-suggesting that its use has been driven largely by the desire to exploit its greater effectiveness rather than by generalized pressures to fi nance bigger government. The primary "but"-there are others-is that the association between the presence of the VAT and total tax revenue is not simple (but rather depends on country circumstances), is not always statistically signifi cant at fi ve percent (though it usually is, and failures are fairly marginal), and may in any event be small. This relative weakness of the evidence for the weak form of the money machine hypothesis is consistent, however, with the relative strength of that for the strong form. The picture that emerges is that the VAT has proved to be a particularly effective form of taxation, but the impact of this on the overall size of government has been substantially diluted-making evidence for the weak form harder to detect-by a tendency to take these gains in large part in the form of reduced use of less effective tax instruments.
As for politics, one certainly fi nd cases in which access to a more effi cient tax instrument, such as the VAT, reduces citizen/voter welfare. But these seem to us to be somewhat strained. This conclusion emerges, in particular, from the discussion above of two models of the political process that capture some essentials of the debate, and have particular resonance in the US context. Both have the feature that politicians cannot precommit to pursue particular policies if they come to offi ce. In one, they are also electorally unconstrained, but attach some weight not only to the surplus that-in Leviathan spirit-they can extract for themselves, but also from citizens' welfare. In the other, politicians differ in type-some are pure Leviathans, the others, wholly benevolent-but are subject to re-election to a second and fi nal term. In both models, and subject to one qualifi cation for the latter, more effi cient tax instruments lead to an increase in citizen/voter welfare: 35 the increase is not as large as it would be if all politicians were benevolent, but, nevertheless, it is an increase. The qualifi cation is that in the second model, welfare can (but need not) fall if increased tax effi ciency changes the nature of the political equilibrium in such a way that past performance in office becomes uninformative as to a politician's true type (and, hence, likely behavior in a fi nal term of offi ce). And this cost can be large enough to outweigh other potential benefi ts only if there is, indeed, a highenough chance that a random candidate would have proved to be "good." That is, precluding the use of a more tax effi cient instrument can reduce welfare only if the number of potential Leviathans is relatively small. In that sense, the more pessimistic is one's view of politicians, the weaker is the case for such restriction. No doubt there exist other models that will yield different conclusions. But the presumption that emerges, for us at least, is that if the VAT is, indeed, a money machine-as our empirical results suggest to be the case-then that is an argument for, not against, its adoption. 
APPENDIX C
In symmetric equilibrium, both candidates propose the same policies, denoted (C*,R*). Given this, the payoff to candidate A (for example) from deviating to some other proposal (C′,R′) is calculated as follows. First, let β be the additional utility that any voter receives if candidate A rather than candidate B implements a particular policy; that is, their bias in favor of A. Then, given β, all voters will vote for A rather than B iff U(C′,R′) + β ≥ U(C*,R*). So, recalling that β is uniformly distributed on [-B,B], the probability that A wins the election by deviating to (C′,R′) is To sign the terms in [C6], recall that U C < 0, ω′ > 0, ω′′ < 0, the last by assumption. Moreover, as U C = V′, it follows that U CC = V″ < 0. This, along with E, B, ω > 0, implies that, as claimed, dC*/dE < 0 and dC*/dB > 0.
